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Abstract
Morace C. Duncan brought an action for the wrongful death of his son, John Norris Duncan.
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Wrongful Death: Florida Still Requires
"Live Birth" as Prerequisite to Recovery:
Duncan v. Flynn
Morace C. Duncan brought an action for the wrongful death of his son,
John Norris Duncan. He named as defendants Dr. John D. Flynn, an
obstetrician; St. Joseph's Hospital; and their insurers, alleging that the
doctor's negligent failure to recognize the necessity of a Caesarian sec-
tion resulted in the death of the baby during the process of delivery. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding
that the plaintiff had no claim for the wrongful death of the "unborn
fetus."' The Sedond District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary
judgment 2 and held that: 1) as a matter of law the decedent was not
born alive, and 2) the "unborn viable fetus" was not a "person" under
Florida's former wrongful death statute.3 The Florida Supreme Court
upheld the district court's ruling on both issues in a 4-3 decision with a
dissent filed by Justice Karl.4
The facts showed that, after Dr. Flynn induced labor and the baby's
head emerged, it became apparent that his shoulders were too broad to
pass through the birth canal. Dr. Flynn and two assisting physicians
tried various procedures for about twenty critical minutes with no suc-
cess. They then realized that the baby's heartbeat had ceased and deter-
mined that the child could not be saved. At this point the physicians
concentrated their efforts on saving the mother's life. With plaintiff's
permission, they severed the child's head and removed the rest of its
body by Caesarian section. The baby was full term and weighed fourteen
pounds, eight ounces (head and torso). The death certificate listed car-
diovascular failure due to strangulation as the cause of death.5
This case marks Florida's most recent failure to divorce itself from
the ranks of the dwindling minority of states which still require a live
I. Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
2. Id. at 127.
3. §§ 768.01-.03 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1973).
4. Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 1978), rehearing denied May 24,
1978.
5. 342 So. 2d at 124.
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birth before allowing a wrongful death claim.' It was decided under the
former Wrongful Death Act7 because the death occurred three and one-
half (31/2) months prior to the effective date of the current Wrongful
Death Act.' It is likely that the outcome would have been similar if
decided under the current Wrongful Death Act,,as each provides a cause
of action for the wrongful death of any "person." 9 Thus, it is a notewor-
thy decision because it is a reaffirmation of the view that Florida courts
have embraced under both the old and the new Wrongful Death Acts.,'
Florida has once again followed the old common law doctrine that it is
cheaper to kill someone than to hurt him. Ironically,while adhering to
this doctrine, the justices have previously conceded that the policy argu-
ments in favor of recovery are compelling."1 Why should Florida cling
6. Of the thirty-eight states which have confronted the issue to date, only twelve
states, including Florida, have required that the death be subsequent to a live birth
before allowing a claim for wrongful death. These states include, Arizona: Kilmer v.
Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P. 2d 706 (1974); California: Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Iowa: McKillp v. Zimmerman,
191 N.W. 2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Missouri: State v. Sanders, 538 S.W. 2d 336 (Mo. 1976);
Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951); New Jersey:
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); New York: Endresz v. Friedberg,
24 N.Y. 2d 478, 248 N.E. 2d 901, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 65 (1969); North Carolina: Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E. 2d 425 (1966); Pennsylvania: Marko v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A. 2d 502 (1966); Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn.
614, 371 S.W. 2d 433 (1963); Virginia: Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169
S.E. 2d 440 (1969).
7. §§ 768.01-.03 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1973).
8. §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1977). This current wrongful death statute became
effective July 1, 1972, and the decedent's death occurred March 20, 1972. The current
wrongful death statute's format and language has remained the same since it became
effective in 1972. Section 768.18(2), however, was amended in 1977. See FLA. STAT.
768.18(2) as amended by ch. 77-468, § 40, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
9. The court noted this similarity in Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978),
where it wrote: "[Ilt is clear that our decision in Stern interpreting the scope of the term
.person' as used in the new Wrongful Death Act applies with equal force to the identical
term as it appeared in the old Wrongful Death Act." Id. at n.3.
10. See, e.g., Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Stern
v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
1i. The supreme court in Stern conceded, "[Tihe reasons for recovery are com-
pelling . . . it is absurd to allow recovery for prenatal injuries unless they are so severe
as to cause death." 348 So. 2d at 306. See also Simon v. United States, 438 F. Supp.
759 (S.D. Fla. 1977) where Judge Atkins wrote: "I am sympathetic to the compelling
arguments in favor of recovery and cognizant of the inequities inherent in allowing a
tortfeasor who so severely injures a fetus that it dies before birth to escape the liability
which would have been imposed had the child survived birth, however briefly." Id. at
761.
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to the minority view while recognizing the policy reasons for allowing
recovery?
This was addressed in Duncan v. Flynn,12 where the Supreme Court
of Florida relied on the principles set forth in two earlier cases 3 in
pronouncing that a baby must die subsequent to a live birth to give rise
to an action for wrongful death." In Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co."5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that an unborn fetus was not
a "minor child" under Florida's former Wrongful Death Act.' How-
ever, that court specifically noted 7 that it did not determine whether a
still-born fetus is a "person" under the old general Wrongful Death
Act.'8 It is puzzling that the court in Stokes took pains to make that
distinction, but phrased its holding in the all-encompassing terms "a
right of action for wrongful death can arise only after the live birth and
subsequent death of the child." 1' If the court truly meant to espouse such
a broad rule of law, then the distinction it made between Sections 768.01
and 768.03 of the Florida Statutes would be senseless. If the baby must
die after a live birth to give rise to a wrongful death action, then it would
follow that the unborn fetus3 can be neither a "minor child" nor a
12. 358 So. 2d 178.
13. Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Stern v. Miller,
348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
14. 358 So. 2d at 178.
13. Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968) (parents had
no cause of action for death of stillborn fetus from prenatal injuries which resulted from
negligence of a motorist).
16. Id. See § 768.03 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT.
(1973) which read:
Whenever the death of any minor child shall be caused by the wrongful act, .
the father of such minor child. . . may maintain an action. . . and may recover
not only for the loss of services of such minor child, but in addition thereto, such
sum for the mental pain and suffering of the parent (or both parents) if they
survive, as the jury may assess.
17. 213 So. 2d at 698.
18. Id. See § 768.01 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT.
(1973) which read:
Whenever the death of any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful
act,. . . of any individual. . . or. . . corporation. . . and the act. . . is such
as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party thereby to maintain
an action. . . and to recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every case
the person or persons who. . . would have been liable to an action for damages,
...notwithstanding the death of the person injured. . ..
19. 213 So. 2d at 700.
20. "Unborn" and "stillborn" are used interchangeably in this discussion. Ac-
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"person." But the court in Stokes cautioned, "[w]e are not here called
upon to determine whether the still-born fetus is a 'person'."- Obviously
the court intended to leave unanswered the question of whether an
unborn fetus is a "person" under the general wrongful death statute and
merely required a live birth for a claim under the special Wrongful
Death of a Minor provisions. 2 This does not, however, preclude a claim
under the general wrongful death statute.
In Stern v. Miller,- decided under the current wrongful death
statute,2- the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad rule of law
mentioned i4 Stokes,- but failed to recognize the internal inconsis-
tency 26 of the Stokes decision. The court in Stern restricted the scope
of its review to a determination of the legislative intent behind the new
Wrongful Death Act.27 The court reasoned that, because Stokes was
decided before the new wrongful death statute was enacted, the legisla-
ture is deemed to have implicitly accepted the judicial construction of
the word "person" contained therein by failing to further define it when
the opportunity arose. At first glance, this argument may seem valid,
but the court ignored the immutable fact that the Stokes decision did
not even purport to construe the word "person," but expressly limited
its inquiry to the proper construction of "minor child" under the former
Wrongful Death of a Minor Child statute. 9
The Supreme Court of Florida now reaffirms that fallacy by hold-
ing in Duncan v. Flynn 31 that Sternst is dispositive of the issue-this
in the face of the clear trend toward allowing wrongful death claims for
tually, "unborn" refers to the child while it is still in utero, whereas "stillborn" refers
to the child which died in utero and has been expelled from the mother's body.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGAUGE,
unabr. (1971).
21. 213 So. 2d at 698.
22. For the distinction between those two sections see notes 16 and 18 supra.
23. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977) (a fetus, which was alleged to have been viable
and to have been fatally injured by defendant's negligence in an automobile accident,
was held not a "person" for purposes of the Wrongful Death Act).
24. §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1973). The court in Stern cited the "current wrong-
ful death statute" as shown. 348 So. 2d at 303. See note 8 supra.
25. 213 So. 2d at 700.
26. Id.
27. 348 So. 2d at 307.
28. id. at 307-08.
29. See text accompanying notes 16 and 18 supra.
30. 358 So. 2d 178.
31. 348 So. 2d 303.
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the death of a viable fetus.32 The court's rationale is that it is following
the legislative intent, yet the only convincing indication of that intent is
found in the new statute itself,3 and the result in" Duncan appears to
be contrary to the express intent of the legislature. Not only does Flor-
ida continue to adhere to the anachronistic view denying recovery for
the wrongful death of the unborn child, but it has now adopted a very
restrictive definition of "live birth."
The Florida Supreme Court found, as a matter of law, that the
32. Verkenner v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (1949) was the first
case to allow such an action. Since then, twenty-five other states have adopted that view.
The court in Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d at 305 listed the following cases from those
twenty-five states: Alabama: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354
(1974); Alaska: Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1972); Connecticut: Gorke
v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A. 2d 448 (1962); District of Columbia: Simmons
v. Howard University, 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo
& Ferrara, Inc., II Terry 258, 50 Del. 258, 128 A. 2d 557 (1956); Georgia: Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E. 2d 100 (1955); Illinois: Chrisafogeorgis v. Branden-
berg, 55 I1l. 2d 368, 304 N.E. 2d 88 (1973); Pleasant v. Certified Growers of Ill, Inc.,
39 III. App. 3d 83, 350 N.E. 2d 65 (1976); Indiana: Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487,
277 N.E. 2d 20 (1971); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P. 2d 1 (1962);
Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W. 2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Orange v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 443 S.W. 2d 650 (Ky. App. 1969); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W. 2d
732 (Ky. App. 1970); Louisiana: Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923);
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Massachusetts:
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E. 2d 916 (Mass. 1975); Maryland: State Use
of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A. 2d 71 (1964); Michigan: O'Neill v. Morse,
385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W. 2d 785 (1971); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
365, 38 N.W. 2d 838, 10 A.L.R. 2d 634 (1949); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222
N.W. 2d 334 (1974); Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954);
Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P. 2d 617 (1969); New Hampshire: Poliquin
v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A. 2d 249 (1957); Oklahoma: Evans v. Olson, 550
P. 2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Ohio: Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 11 Ohio Ops.
2d 383, 167 N.E. 2d 106 (1959); Oregon: Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258,
518 P. 2d 636 (1974), rehearing denied, 520 P. 2d 361 (Or. 1974); Rhode Island: Presley
v. Newport Hosp., 365 A. 2d 748 (R.I. 1976); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward,
244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E. 2d 42 (1964); Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F. 2d 75 (4th
Cir. 1974); Washington: Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P. 2d 266 (1975); West
Virginia: Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E. 2d 428 (1971); Panagopoulous
v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W. 2d 107 (1967).
33. § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977) entitled "[l]egislative intent" states that "[ilt is
the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs
from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. Sections 768.16-.27 are remedial
and shall be liberally construed." (emphasis added).
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Duncan baby was not born alive."4 This raises two questions: 1) Were
the criteria used to define "live birth" valid; and 2) Was a strict rule of
law defining "live birth" warranted?
Consider the factors used to determine whether or not there was a
live birth. The court held that the child must acquire a "separate and
independent existence of its mother ' 3 5 evidenced by "expulsion (or in
a Caesarian section, by the complete removal) of the child's body from
its mother with evidence that the cord has been cut and the infant has
an independent circulation of blood. ' 36 It appears that the court has
identified the most commonly used criteria 37 (although respiration is
often mentioned)," but has inexplicably required proof of every factor.
The plaintiff pointed out that the baby's head was born spontaneously
and life existed for at least twenty minutes until death occured by
"cardiovascular failure due to strangulation. ' ' 39 These facts would cer-
tainly tend to indicate that the baby had achieved an independent circu-
lation and respiration before the cessation of his heartbeat tones led the
doctors to believe that he could not be saved. The only elements of "live
birth" not satisfied were expulsion from the mother's body and sever-
ance of the umbilical cord. These are precisely the acts which plaintiff
claimed were prevented by defendant's negligence. Although the criteria
used were not unprecedented, the reason for requiring proof of each one
is unclear.
A strict rule of law defining live birth is neither necessary nor
useful. Justice Karl recognized this fact in his dissenting opinion, 0 in
which Justices Adkins and Hatchett joined. That such a rule is unneces-
sary becomes apparent upon perusal of the relevant case law. Several
jurisdictions allow the jury to decide the issue as a question of fact.'
Moreover, the variety of circumstances and contexts to which the rule
34. 358 So. 2d at 179.
35. 342 So. 2d at 126.
36. Id.
37. Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 413 (1975). The question of when a live birth occurs
usually arises in the context of homicide statutes.
38. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W. 2d 1014 (1936);
States v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E. 2d 856 (1972); Bennett v. State, 377 P. 2d
634 (Wyo. 1963).
39. 342 So. 2d at 124.
40. 358 So. 2d at 179.
41. See Bennett v. State, 377 P. 2d 634 (Wyo. 1963); State v. Toney, 98 W. Va.
236, 127 S.E. 35 (1925); Hubbard v. State, 72 Ala. 164 (1882); People v. Chavez, 77
Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P. 2d 92 (1947); But see Justus v. Atchison, 53 Cal. App.,3d 556,
126 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1975) (restricting application of Chavez to homicide cases).
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must be applied make it somewhat less than useful, especially when
compared with the alternative. The most logical resolution of the issue
would be to present the evidence and expert medical testimony to the
jury and let that panel decide whether or not a live birth occurred. A
fact finder's determination would eliminate the need for a strict, inflexi-
ble rule of law and allow for a complete consideration of all relevant
facts in each case. The facts of the present case provide us with a sterling
example of the disadvantages of the rule adopted in Florida. The death
certificate showed cardiovascular failure due to strangulation as the
cause of death. Strangulation denotes compression of the windpipe until
death occurs by cessation of breathing.' 2 The physicians noticed that the
baby's heartbeat tones disappeared some twenty minutes after the head
had emerged from the birth canal. Surely these facts would be sufficient
to raise a permissible inference of live birth. This is especially true since
there has never been formulated a satisfactory definition of live birth
on which the courts could agree."
There are several public policy considerations which support the
majority view.4 First, the viable fetus is a human life capable of exist-
ence independent of the mother and there should be a remedy for the
wrongful extinguishment of such a life. Otherwise there is a wrong with
no remedy. Is not the purpose of tort law to avoid this situation?" The
majority view achieves the desirable goal of shifting the loss from the
survivors to the wrongdoer. Since an action for prenatal injuries can be
brought once a child is born," it seems incongruous to preclude recovery
where the injury is so severe as to cause death in utero.17 The instant
case presents the precise situation cited by commentators and courts to
discredit the position taken by the supreme court." It appears that the
42. C. TABER, TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY (13th ed. 1977);
WEBSTER'S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
unabr. (1971).
43. Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 413 (1975).
44. Annot., 15 A.L.R. 3d 994 (1967).
45. Dean Prosser states that the purpose of tort law is "to afford compensation
for injuries sustained by one person as a result of the conduct of another," the goal being
to "adjust these losses." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § I at 6 (4th
ed. 1971).
46. Day v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1976); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 55 at 336-7 (4th ed. 1971).
47. See Comment, The Conditional Liability Rule-A Viable Alternative for the
Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Child, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 187. See also §§ 768.16-.27
FLA. STAT. (1977).
48. See generally Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1977); Todd v.
Duncan v. Flynn 331 13:1979
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statute in Florida disallows a wrongful death action where the injury is
serious enough to cause death of the fetus before birth, but allows an
action for damages if the child suffers less serious injury not resulting
in death. 9 This allows the tortfeasor to avoid liability by inflicting the
ultimate injury.10 It has been argued that since this factor refers to
intentional conduct it is not relevant to cases involving the presumably
more prevalent negligent conduct."1 But the fact remains that the tort-
feasor, whether acting negligently or intentionally, is provided with a
legal incentive to prevent this "live birth" of the child. Surely such an
unthinkable Kesult was not intended by the legislature and should be
avoided by the courts.
Aside from these policy considerations, the unique facts of the
instant case emphasize the problems inherent in the position adopted in
Florida. This case can be distinguished from the cases discussed above
because here the child died during an attempt at delivery, allegedly as
the result of the negligent methods and procedures of the defendant. In
the other cases discussed, the child died either in the uterus or subse-
quent to delivery. Those cases invariably involved pre-natal or post-
natal injuries, never injuries during parturition. The facts of this case
are unique and do not admit of the simplistic characterization of the
child as an "unborn viable fetus," a "stillbirth" or a "live birth." The
requirement of live birth precluded recovery to the survivors for the
death of their child without any rational basis or justification. The pain
and suffering directly experienced by the mother may give rise to a
separate case of action, but that relates to a separate and distinct injury.
While it is true that the wrongful death statute is in derogation of
common law and might, therefore, be strictly construed, both the legis-
lature and the courts have recognized its remedial nature and have
agreed that a liberal construction is called for."2 Where is this liberal
construction?
Due to its strict rather than liberal construction of the statute, the
court entered summary judgment against the defendant. Summary judg-
ment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
Sandidge, 341 F. 2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1964). See also note 47 supra.
49. 328 So. 2d 560.
50. 341 F. 2d at 77.
51. 62 AM. JuR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 15 at 623 (1972).
52. See § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977); Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955)
(pertaining to the old wrongful death statute). § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977) states that,
"[slections 768.16-768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed."
1 332 3:1979 1
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the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.0 The
question of "live birth" has been held to constitute a genuine issue of
material fact in other jurisdictions." The court's insistence on infringing
upon what is generally the jury's domain is totally unjustifiable. Keeping
in mind that Florida courts have not previously ruled on when "live
birth" occurs, instituting a strict rule of law could defeat the purpose
of the Wrongful Death Act."
Case law in Florida clearly disfavors summary judgments in negli-
gence cases." This is especially true with regard to medical malpractice
cases such as the one at hand. 7 Summary judgment is a harsh remedy
which should be administered very cautiously, 8 so as not to deprive a
litigant of a full and fair trial on the merits of the case. In view of the
close question of whether a live birth ever occurred, the propriety of a
summary judgment in this case was indeed questionable.
In Duncan, a young couple lost their child through the negligence
of another, yet were not afforded the opportunity to try the case on its
merits. After recognizing the compelling nature of the public policy
arguments in favor of recovery, the Florida Supreme Court based its
position on a questionable "legislative intent" rationale. The court also
pronounced a flat rule of law defining live birth as "expulsion of the
child's body from its mother with evidence that the cord has been cut
and the infant has independent circulation of blood,"59 which seems to
be an injustice to the plaintiff in this case.
Reed B. McClosky
53. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
54. See note 41 supra.
55. As stated, the purpose of the Wrongful Death Act is "to shift the losses
resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrong-
doer." § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977).
56. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1965); Visengardi v. Tyrone, 193 So. 2d
601 (Fla. 1966).
57. Id.
58. Pearson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA
1966); Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1957); Seven-Up Bottling Co. of
Miami v. George Const. Corp., 166 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
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